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Schach: A Survey of Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1

V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. ProsecutorialMisconduct

The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently affirmed
criminal convictions that were obtained in part by prosecutorial
misconduct. Although the court has expressly stated that
misconduct by prosecutors will no longer be tolerated,1 the
court seems hesitant to remand convictions acquired when
prosecutors behave inappropriately.
In State v. Smith,2 the court affirmed a conviction despite
the prosecutor's misconduct.' The defendant, Carlos Orlando
Smith (Smith), was convicted of first-degree murder, seconddegree murder, and aggravated robbery in Ramsey County
District Court.4 Smith was convicted of shooting and killing
Dural Woods during a drug sale that occurred in St. Paul.5
After the incident but prior to trial, Smith was detained in
the Ramsey County Adult Detention Center where he was a
cellmate with Tor White (White).6 In a presentence investiga-

1. See State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 1995); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d
538 (Minn. 1994); State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1993).
In Wiams, the defendant's conviction was reversed and remanded for new trial
because of an improper argument made by the prosecutor. Williams, 525 N.W.2d at
549. The underlying conviction involved possession of more than ten grams of cocaine
with intent to sell. Id. at 540. When the defendant raised lack of conscious possession
of the drugs as a defense, the prosecutor belittled this argument by telling the jury that
the only reason this defense was raised was because the defendant did not have a
plausible defense. Id. at 548-49. The court reversed and remanded the defendant's
subsequent conviction because of this misconduct by the prosecutor. Id. at 549.
2. 541 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. 1995).
3. Id. at 586.
4. Id.
5. Id. The incident is said to have occurred as follows:
[Smith] approached Woods and asked if 'he knew where [Smith] could get
a sack of Indow (high quality marijuana).' Woods replied, 'I got a $40.00
sack.' Smith then handed Woods $40.00 and Woods handed him the sack.
Smith checked the sack and observed that 'it didn't look like it and smell like
it, and I told him I didn't want it, I wanted my money back.' Woods refused
and a struggle ensued in which both Woods and Smith drew guns. Smith
testified that Woods fired first and that in self defense he shot back. Smith
recalls shooting at Woods twice while Woods was standing and twice more after
he had fallen.
Id. at 586-87.
6. Id. at 587.
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tion report, White stated that Smith admitted to the shooting yet
did not mention that it was in self-defense.7 White agreed to
testify at trial only if he would get a twenty-four-month sentence
At trial,
reduction on a pending sale of cocaine charge.'
however, the prosecutor failed to inform the jury that White's
testimony resulted from his twenty-four-month plea bargain
agreement. In fact, White falsely stated that he did not expect
to receive special consideration for testifying.9 Smith appealed
his subsequent conviction stating that the prosecutor's misconduct prejudiced his trial. Smith argued that the credibility of
White's testimony would have been undermined if thejury knew
of the plea bargain agreement."0
The court stated that it "review[s] the alleged misconduct in
light of the whole record and will reverse if the misconduct
appears to be inexcusable and so serious and prejudicial that a
defendant's right to a fair trial is denied." 1 The court stated
that although a prosecutor has a duty to disclose any plea
bargain agreements relating to a defendant's case, "nondisclosure in this case is not reversible error because White was not a
material witness and his credibility was not an important

issue. "" Although White's testimony made it virtually impossible for Smith to argue self-defense, the court did not consider
White to be a "material witness." The prosecutor's misconduct
was not deemed severe enough to warrant a new trial.
Similarly, in State v. Gaitan,'5 the court again affirmed a
defendant's conviction that was obtained in part by the prosecutor's misconduct. The defendant, Israel Ray Gaitan,Jr. (Gaitan),

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 588 (citing State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 420 (Minn. 1980)). The
court also stated that where false testimony is given, a new trial may be granted where:
(a) the court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material wimess
is false; (b) the jury might have reached a different conclusion without the testimony;
(c) the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was
given; and (d) the party seeking the new trial was unable to meet the false testimony
or did not know of its falsity until after the trial. See id. (citing State v. Caldwell, 322
N.W.2d 574, 584-85 (Minn. 1982)).
12. Id.
13. 536 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1995).
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was convicted of first-degree felony murder." Gaitan argued
on appeal that he was entitled to reversal because the evidence
was legally insufficient to warrant his conviction.15 Alternatively,
Gaitan claimed that a new trial was warranted because "the
prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during opening
statement, direct examination of a state's witness,
cross-examina16
tion of defendant, and closing argument."

Gaitan and two other men were convicted of killing fifty-six
year-old Ramon Guardiola on July 17, 1993 in Tracy, Minnesota.17 Witnesses at trial testified that Gaitan, Julio Rodriguez,
and Gilberto Arredondo spent that evening drinking beer and
smoking marijuana. Guardiola was invited to join the three
men.18 Gaitan and Arredondo decided to rob Guardiola by
"spiking" his drink with Tegretol, a drug Gaitan believed would
make Guardiola fall asleep. 9 Although Guardiola drank some
of the tainted beer, he did not fall asleep. As a result, Gaitan,
Rodriguez and Arredondo began beating him. Rodriguez took
five twenty-dollar bills from Guardiola.2 ° After the robbery,
Arredondo forced Guardiola outside to a nearby drainage ditch
that was waist-high with water. Apparently, Guardiola drowned.
When Gaitan was asked whether Guardiola was dead, Gaitan
responded that he was "about as dead as they come." 1 Two
days later, Guardiola's body was discovered in the drainage ditch
and Gaitan was subsequently apprehended.
Gaitan argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct at
trial and therefore his conviction must be remanded for a new
trial. 2 Specifically, Gaitan complained that the prosecutor
behaved inappropriately during his cross-examination. The
prosecutor asked Gaitan whether he had sexually assaulted
Guardiola in the ditch prior to killing him." Also, the prosecu14. Id. at 12. Gaitan's conviction included offenses under Minnesota Statutes §
609.04. Gaitan was sentenced to life in prison. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 13. Gaitan and Guardiola historically did not get along with each other.
However, Gaitan was aware that Guardiola had a sizeable amount of cash and that it
would be profitable to rob him. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.at 17.
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tor insinuated on cross-examination that Gaitan told fellow
inmates that he planned to kill one person each year that he was
incarcerated.24 The court stated that it would no longer
tolerate misconduct by prosecutors. However, in the very same
paragraph, the court affirmed Gaitan's conviction stating that the
alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not warrant a new trial.25
The prosecutor's conduct was found to be not above reproach,
but the evidence against Gaitan was sufficient to support his
conviction.26
In light of the Gaitan and Smith decisions, it is clear that the
Minnesota Supreme Court is hesitant to remand cases for new
trial solely because of prosecutorial misconduct. 27 The supreme
court may believe that remanding cases is an inefficient use of
the district courts' time and resources. However, if the court
were to remand cases similar to Gaitan and Smith, prosecutors
might conform their behavior to that which is considered
appropriate.
B. Multiple Sentences

The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently applied
Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 in several decisions. 2 This
24. Id. The prosecutor also asked Gaitan whether the witnesses whose testimonies
were inconsistent with his were lying. Id. Gaitan also complained about some of the
statements the prosecutor made during closing argument. Specifically, Gaitan objected
to the prosecutor telling the jury that Gaitan created a "lot of inconsistencies for
himself." Id. The prosecutor also stated, "[T]hat is the problem with not telling the
truth. It is very difficult to maintain a lie because you run the risk of forgetting what
you have said about the situation on prior occasions. That is what happened to the
defendant." Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The Minnesota Supreme Court has also recently refused to remand cases to the
district court in other cases where the prosecutor allegedly committed misconduct. See
State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 1995) (finding that improprieties in the
prosecutor's closing argument did not require a new trial); see alsoState v. Washington,
521 N.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Minn. 1994) (holding that a prosecutor's improper reference to
a defendant's character during closing argument did not substantially influence the
jury).
28. Minnesota Statutes § 609.035 reads in pertinent part:
Subdivision 1. Except as provided in subdivision 2, and in sections 609.251,
609.585,609.21, subdivisions 3 and 4, 609.2691, 609.486,609.494, and 609.856,
if a person's conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this
state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a
conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any
other of them. All the offenses, if prosecuted, shall be included in one
prosecution which shall be stated in separate counts.
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statute has been interpreted to prohibit multiple sentences based
on multiple criminal offenses arising out of a single behavioral
incident." The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently reviewed the application of this statute in State v. Hawkins"° and
31 These cases are indicative of how the supreme
State v. PitteL
court currently defines "single behavioral incident."
In Hawkins, the defendant was convicted of attempted firstdegree murder and aggravated robbery. The district court
sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 240 months for
attempted first-degree murder and 216 months for aggravated
robbery.3 2 The defendant appealed the multiple sentences
arguing that they were in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.035. The defendant's convictions stemmed from an incident
on December 5, 1991, where Michael Wold, an undercover
narcotics agent, was robbed and assaulted by the defendant.3
Agent Wold planned to purchase two ounces of cocaine in a St.
Paul apartment building during an undercover operation. Not

MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subd. 1 (1994).
29. See State v. Wipper, 512 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1994) (holding that a defendant
convicted of first-degree murder could not be convicted separately for lesser offenses
of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder based on the
same criminal act); State v. Stith, 292 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn. 1980) (finding that theft
of two separate checks at two different times by defendant in swindle schemes were
"separate behavioral incidents" even though they were motivated by a single goal to
swindle as much as possible, and therefore defendant was properly sentenced on two
counts of theft by swindle); State v. Huynh, 504 N.W.2d 477, 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that a trial court can impose only one sentence of multiple crimes against the
same victim, committed as part of a single behavioral incident); State v. Clark, 486 N.W
2d 166, 170 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a motorist could not be convicted of
both driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with blood-alcohol concentration of .10, where both convictions arose out of acts committed during a single
behavioral incident); State v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613, 622 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that Minnesota Statutes § 609.035 only applies if conduct involved is motivated
by desire to obtain a single criminal objective, offenses occur at substantially same time
and place, arise in continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, and manifest
indivisible state of mind); State v. Secrest, 437 N.W.2d 683, 684-85 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that a prosecution for two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct for actions which allegedly took place in one county was not barred by

Minnesota Statutes § 609.035 by defendant's earlier guilty plea in another county to
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct that took place in other county with same
juvenile during same period; contacts between defendant and juvenile in different
counties were not part of same behavioral incident).
30. 511 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1994).
31. 518 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1994).
32. Hawkins, 511 N.W.2d at 10-11.
33. Id. at 11.
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knowing that Wold was a narcotics agent, the defendant beat and
robbed Wold in the stairwell of the St. Paul apartment building. 4 During the assault and robbery, defendant used a piece
of leather filled with lead weights to injure Wold. Wold believed
that it was the defendant's intentions to rob him and kill him. 5
Wold successfully fended off the defendant by kicking him down
the stairs and then waited until police officers arrived and
arrested the defendant.
The defendant was convicted in Ramsey County District
Court of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated robbery.
He appealed his multiple sentences, arguing that the attempted
murder and the aggravated robbery were part of a single
behavioral incident and therefore the 6216-month sentence for
aggravated robbery should be vacated.
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the defendant
and vacated his 216-month sentence. The court reasoned that
"[t] o protect people convicted of multiple offenses from having
the criminality of their conduct exaggerated, Minnesota Statutes
section 609.035 (1992) prohibits multiple sentences for offenses
that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.""
This was a single behavioral incident because both crimes were
motivated by a desire to obtain a single criminal objective, i.e.,
to escape apprehension or at least to rob Wold. 8 The court
reasoned that the robbery and the attempted murder occurred
at the same time and place and that the attempted murder
resulted from the defendant's desire to avoid apprehension for
the aggravated robbery.3 9 Therefore, the court held that the
multiple sentences were in violation of Minnesota Statute section
609.035 and that the 216-month sentence for aggravated robbery
must be vacated.'
In Pitte, the court held that the defendant's multiple
sentences were not in violation of Minnesota Statutes section

34. Id.
35. Id. The doctor who examined Wold immediately after the assault and robbery
testified at trial that a piece of leather filled with lead weights could kill someone. Id.
36. Id. at 13.
37. Id. (citing State v. Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d 449, 449 (Minn. 1986)).
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 13-14.
40. Id. at 14. The court expressly noted that it was irrelevant that the 216 month
sentence for aggravated robbery ran concurrently with the 260 month sentence for
attempted first-degree murder. Id.
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609.035."1 The defendant in Pittel was convicted in the district
court on thirteen counts of theft.4 2 On six of the counts, the
defendant received concurrent sentences of fifteen, eighteen,
twenty-one, nineteen, thirty-two, and eighty-two months. The
defendant argued that these multiple sentences violated
Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 3 because the offenses arose
out of a single behavioral incident.1
The underlying theft convictions arose out of the defendant's conduct as a wholesaler of cruise vacation packages. The
defendant sold roughly $28,000 worth of bogus cruise vacations
to Gail Gayda, an owner of a travel agency." Gayda sent her
clients' money to the defendant for him to arrange cruise
vacations.
However, instead of purchasing the cruises for
Gayda's clients, the defendant kept part of the money for his
own personal use.4 5
The defendant argued that all of his theft convictions and
sentences resulted from one single behavioral incident because
they stemmed from a single illegal scheme.'
The court
disagreed. It considered the defendant's bogus wholesaler
operation as a series of separate thefts that did not stem from a
single behavioral incident.47 Although the defendant had only
one plan to swindle people out of their money, the thefts
affected several victims and the thefts occurred on different days.
Because the thefts were not a "single behavioral incident," the
multiple sentences were not prohibited by Minnesota Statutes
section 609.035.'
Hawkins and Pitteldemonstrate how the Minnesota Supreme
Court currently applies Minnesota Statutes section 609.035. The
application of the statute is dependant on the underlying facts

41. State v. Pittel, 518 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Minn. 1994).
42. State v. Pittel, No. C4-93-1359, 1994 WL 146211, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 26,
1994). The Minnesota Court of Appeals granted the defendant relief from some of his
convictions and affirmed only six counts of theft. Id. at *2.
43. Pitte4 518 N.W.2d at 608.
44. Id. at 607.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 608.
47, Id. The court cited State v. Eaton, 292 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 1980), where
the court upheld multiple sentences for multiple convictions that stemmed from a
single scheme in which victims were cheated out of money on two separate dates.
48. Pitte 518 N.W.2d at 608.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996

7

226

WILLLAM
William Mitchell
LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. LAW
22, Iss.REVIEW
1 [1996], Art. 19

[Vol. 22

of the convictions, specifically, whether the convictions stem
from a single behavioral incident.
David T Schach
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